###!!! ASSERTION: This is unsafe!: 'Error', file /Users/jruderman/mozilla-central/content/events/src/nsEventDispatcher.cpp, line 485 This is the assertion just added in bug 531176. I'm not sure why I need the setTimeout.

So nsBrowserStatusFilter::OnStateChange calls some JS code which end up to progressmeter.xml which dispatches ValueChange. In this particular case I wonder why we even call OnStateChange. I believe the document is already loaded but #21 0x00007f82d1f3e2ec in nsDocument::BlockOnload (this=0x261b070) at /home/smaug/mozilla/mozilla_cvs/hg/src/content/base/src/nsDocument.cpp:7037 #22 0x00007f82d20e85c8 in nsBindingManager::AddToAttachedQueue (this=0x2158530, aBinding=0x226a5e0) at /home/smaug/mozilla/mozilla_cvs/hg/src/content/xbl/src/nsBindingManager.cpp:955 adds new request to load group which triggers the method call. Investigating...

But still, I think we can't easily prevent progress listeners to dispatch events.

Hmm. We should avoid calling progress listeners for BlockOnload calls if we can do it... Maybe we should stop faking the loadgroup thing and just directly have BlockOnload/UnblockOnload poke the docloader or something?

An example of this assertion can be seen on Windows 1.9.3 at least at http://www.slacker.com/

Not sure if this is sg:critical (at least when using the testcase). That is happening in chrome, and during time we might get dom modifications anyway.

I wonder if, at least for now, the assertion should fire only if the target of the event is in content.

Repeating this: > Not sure if this is sg:critical (at least when using the testcase). > That is happening in chrome, and during time we might get dom modifications > anyway. What in this bug makes this sg:critical ?

I only marked it as sg:critical because the assertion was added in an sg:critical bug. If this bug isn't a security bug, let's unmark the whiteboard and make it public.

Well, I wouldn't remove the security flag from this bug, but this just may not be sg:critical.

Olli, if this only results in events being fired at chrome windows, then why not remove the security flag?

Olli, any more thoughts on whether this needs to be sg:critical, or if it's even a security bug any more?

comment 4 says what should be done here, I think. I think this doesn't need to be sg:critical, since there is no clear evidence that content can trigger anything bad - unless ff ui or some extension starts to handle status updates in a different way. But this is still a security bug.

Looks like we should probably remove the sg:crit rating here, but there's ongoing discussion of what the ration should be. Thoughts?

If this is a critical vulnerability only exposed to extension code presently, we should lower the severity to sg:high. If we think it's likely that FF UI code would add changes triggering this vuln, then sg:critical severity is appropriate.

Or we can just fix this and not care too much about sg:*. :) Taking. I'll try to write the patch on Thursday.

Um, I can't reproduce this atm. I've tried on Linux and OSX, with and without html5 parser. The assertion in this case was changed to a warning, but I can't see that either. I wonder if bug 557398 changed something here. Testing...

Backing out bug 557398 doesn't seem to affect to this bug.

Ah, perhaps LazyFrameCtor changed timing here. Which means this would still need to be fixed in 1.9.2.

Not LazyFrameCtor. Still trying to find a build where I get the error

I can reproduce this at least on 1.9.2, when I added the same assertion/warning what trunk has. But patch needs to wait at least til tomorrow.

I posted this to tryserver

Comment on attachment 441281 [details] [diff] [review] patch Passed tests on tryserver. Boris, what do you think about this approach? A bit ugly, but since I think we want this to 1.9.2 too, I didn't want to make huge changes. And I'm not even sure what would be the best way to change nsDocLoader or something. It would be quite hackish to add onloadblocker-type-of-requests and handle them specially in docloader. This relies on script blockers to be on stack and PostUnblockOnloadEvent to handle things truly async.

Would it make sense to do: if (!nsContentUtils::IsSafeToRunScript()) { ++mAsyncOnloadBlockCount; if (mAsyncOnloadBlockCount == 1) { nsContentUtils::AddScriptRunner( NS_NEW_RUNNABLE_METHOD(nsDocument, this, AsyncBlockOnload)); } return; } and have AsyncBlockOnload call BlockOnload mAsyncOnLoadBlockCount times, so as not to thrash things with lots of scriptrunners? Having an API on docloader (whose job it is to keep track of when onload should fire) to block onload would be a lot less hacky than having this fake request, btw. But making it work right might be a pain... Why is the new block in DoUnblockOnload needed? How can we get there with mAsyncOnloadBlockCount != 0?

(In reply to comment #24) > Would it make sense to do: > ... > and have AsyncBlockOnload call BlockOnload mAsyncOnLoadBlockCount times, so as > not to thrash things with lots of scriptrunners? That should work. > Why is the new block in DoUnblockOnload needed? How can we get there with > mAsyncOnloadBlockCount != 0? If some script runner (which is added before the AsyncBlockOnload script runner, so it runs before it) processes event loop.

Ah, ok. Do you want to post a patch with my suggestion from the beginning of comment 24?

Yeah, I will, in a minute.

Like this?

Comment on attachment 441519 [details] [diff] [review] v2 Space after "while", please.

uh, how did I miss the space :/ Anyway, this is a security bug, so sr is needed.

Comment on attachment 441526 [details] [diff] [review] +space Please add documentation on the member describing how it works. Took reading this a few times to figure it out. And add a comment to ::BlockOnload describing *why* we're entering the if-statement.

http://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/6f7405a55a48 http://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/e5a075d4e5ba

Just wanting to get this on the wanted/blocking list for future 1.9.2 release, as per earlier comments stating that this also affects 1.9.2.

Does this affect 1.9.1 as well?

Bug 569674 is another regression from this, we need to figure that out before landing this on branches. Sorry I didn't mark it sooner.

Disregard comment 36, I was thinking this was a different bug.

Comment on attachment 441743 [details] [diff] [review] +some comments a=LegNeato for 1.9.2.6 and 1.9.1.11. Please land this on mozilla-1.9.2 default and mozilla-1.9.1 default. Code freeze is this Friday @ 11:59 pm PST.

http://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-1.9.2/rev/336a77f067c8 http://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-1.9.1/rev/866db4f8b8f3

http://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-1.9.2/rev/2c5245d56edb http://hg.mozilla.org/releases/mozilla-1.9.1/rev/e2498d527265

Verified for 1.9.2 with Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.7pre) Gecko/20100630 Namoroka/3.6.7pre ( .NET CLR 3.5.30729) using the attached testcase.

Comment on attachment 441743 [details] [diff] [review] +some comments Requesting approval1.9.0.next on this patch so that we can take it in upcoming Camino 2.0.x security and stability updates. If approved, I'll handle the checkins, unless the patch author requests otherwise.

Comment on attachment 441743 [details] [diff] [review] +some comments Approved for 1.9.0.20, a=dveditz

Checking in content/base/src/nsDocument.cpp; /cvsroot/mozilla/content/base/src/nsDocument.cpp,v <-- nsDocument.cpp new revision: 3.837; previous revision: 3.836 done Checking in content/base/src/nsDocument.h; /cvsroot/mozilla/content/base/src/nsDocument.h,v <-- nsDocument.h new revision: 3.381; previous revision: 3.380 done

Crashtest: http://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/rev/524a5670133b