Closed
Bug 60096
Opened 24 years ago
Closed 2 years ago
Official XPI packages should be signed
Categories
(Core :: Security, defect, P3)
Tracking
()
RESOLVED
WORKSFORME
Future
People
(Reporter: adamlock, Assigned: dveditz)
Details
(Keywords: topembed-, Whiteboard: [T2])
The official XPI packages that constitute Mozilla the application should be
signed. This includes the PSM package.
Mozilla should contain signature validation code (even if only for its own key)
and the user should be presented with a dialog warning about security etc.
whenever an XPI package is about to be installed and whether it is signed or
not.
Comment 1•24 years ago
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Agreed. We already have signature verification code, and it should be hooked up
to the installer.
Status: NEW → ASSIGNED
Comment 3•24 years ago
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->Future, but I still think we should have this feature if we can make it practical.
Target Milestone: --- → Future
As I see it, xpi packages can install just about any files into your mozilla
directory, this can be a major security risk. It seems like there is definatly
an ability for someone to create a malisious xpi. We should atleast warn uses
when installing an xpi, that this can install random files into your computer
and can completly mess up your system (in nicerwords anyways) and if its signed,
jsut give the description that comes with the signature of what the installer
does :)
Comment 5•23 years ago
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we *do* warn the user of the consequences before allowing an xpinstall to occur.
We always have. What do you mena by "the description that comes with the
signature of what the installer does." There's no such description. Signing just
verifies the authorship of the xpi, not what it does.
Comment 6•23 years ago
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performance, footprint, feature work, and re-architecture bugs will be addressed
in 0.9.8
Target Milestone: Future → mozilla0.9.8
Comment 7•23 years ago
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I don't think we're going to have this done by Moz 1.0. If anyone thinks this is
really needed by then, talk to me.
Target Milestone: mozilla0.9.8 → Future
Updated•23 years ago
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Comment 9•20 years ago
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On a related note, patches that come 'officially' from the Mozilla organization
(like the recent fix for the shell: vulnerability) should be signed.
Its actually incomprehensible to me how Mozilla could distribute an unsigned
patch for a security vulnerability, to be applied to current versions of
Firefox, Thunderbird, and Mozilla - especially in light of the most recent IE
vulnerabilities, and CERT recommending Mozilla/Firefox over IE.
This seems like a simple oversight that should be very easy to correct.
Comment 10•20 years ago
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Is this bug obsolet and tracked anywhere else?
I believe this is quite an issue..
Comment 11•19 years ago
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Still not fixed: https://addons.mozilla.org/messages/307259.html
Unsigned, huh?!
Assignee | ||
Updated•18 years ago
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Assignee: security-bugs → dveditz
Status: ASSIGNED → NEW
QA Contact: bsharma → toolkit
Updated•2 years ago
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Severity: normal → S3
Assignee | ||
Comment 12•2 years ago
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This was long fixed. see bug 1038068 and bug 1186522, for example.
Status: NEW → RESOLVED
Closed: 2 years ago
Resolution: --- → WORKSFORME
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Description
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